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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JAMES KOROBAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case
No. 8636

vs.
JAMES A. HENDERSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The action below was for breach of a construction contract.
Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of no cause of action
dated and entered January 14, 1957 (R. 60).
No proof was adduced at the trial; this appeal is based
primarily upon the pleadings and rulings of the Court tnade
at a pre-trial conference and a pro forma trial.
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On March 25, 1952 the appellant and respondent entered
into a written contract by the terms of which the respondent
entered into a written contract by the terms of which the
respondent was to construct for appellant a building at Eighth
East and Third South Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 1,
par. 2; R. 10, par. 2) . It was to be a store building consisting
of four storerooms, built according to the plans and specifications prepared by a named engineer (R. 4, par. 1). The contract
price was $29,600.00 (R. 6, Par. 17), subject to change if prices
charged by sub-contractors were changed (R. 36, 65).
The complaint enumerated defects in workmanship and
variations in the plans of the building as finally completed
by the respondent (R. 2). The first defense was that final
payment had been made by the appellant to the respondent
on December 5, 1952, and that this payment constituted acceptance of the building and conclusion of the contract (R. 8).
The same defense included a contention that by the terms of
paragraph 23 (R. 6) the appellant's sole remedy for faulty
workmanship and materials was "stopping the job or taking
possession of t'he work or supplying satisfactory materials or
workmen as the job progressed.'· The defense alluded to
paragraph 15 (R. 5) of the contract but did not contend that
the terms of that paragraph barred the present action.
On November 2, 1956, a pre-trial conference \vas held
before Hon. A. H. Ellett, Judge of the Third Judical District
Court (R. _)2). At that conference the action against one of
the original defendants, General Casualty Company of America,
\\'~ts disrnisscd ( R. 5)), ~1nd the dismissal is not at issue in this
~•ppeal. H()\vcvcr, the court also concluded that the action of
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appellant against respondent was barred by ~he prov1s1ons
of Paragraph 15 of the contract and that appellant could not
recover, as a matter of law, for any defects except those which
\Vere latent at the time of final payment (R. 39, 45). The court
also decided, as a matter of law, which defects were latent
(R. 39-43). A trial was conducted on November 29, 1956
(R. 48), at which time the respondent tendered to appellant
the amount of $13 7.60 as payment for the items listed in Paragraph 4.A. 7 and 4.A.9 of the complaint (R. 48). The appellant
accepted the tender, but without waiving any rights as to any
other injuries (R. 49). The court having indicated that recovery
for all patent defects was barred by Paragraph 15, and that
it would sustain objections to any evidence relating to· patent
defects (R. 51), the appellant rested his case (R. 50).
Paragraph 25 of the contract (R. 7) provided for recovery
of costs and a reasonable attorney's fee expended by a party
in enforcement of the contract.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Court's interpretation of Paragraph 15 of the

contract as prohibiting recovery for patent defects was erroneous.
2. The Court erred in ruling as a matter of law that certain

defects were patent and others latent.

3. 'rhc Court erred iu failing to award to plaintiff a
reasonable attorney's fee for enforcement of the contract.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH
15 OF THE CONTRACT AS PROHIBITING RECOVERY
FOR PATENT DEFECTS WAS ERRONEOUS.
It is elementary that a cause of action for damages arises
upon breach of a contract, and that the obligation to pay
damages is law-imposed. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 388; 9 Am.
Jur ., Building and Construction Contracts, § 116. The action
in the present case was not directly involved with conditions,
whether precedent or subsequent, but was an action for failure
to perform as promised.
The Court below held that notwithstanding the breach
the plaintiff could not recover his damages. The ruling ,vas
based upon a construction of Paragraph 15 of the contract
(R. 5, 59), which provides:
''If ei~her party to this Contract shall suffer damage
in any manner because of any \vrongful act or neglect
of the other party or of anyone employed by him, then
he shall be reimbursed by the other party for such
damage. Claims under this clause shall be made in
writing to the party liable \vithin a reasonable time at
the first observance of such damage and not later than
the time of final payment. except as expressly stipulated
other,vise in the case of faulty \Vork or materials, and
shall be adjusted by agreement or arbitration."
The trial court construed the above paragraph as being a
general non-claim provision functioning to prohibit claims
not only for '" rongful acts and neglects but for failure to
perforn1 the work required by the contract or for performing it
othenvise than as required by the contract. The paragraph
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does not purport to be that broad. A breakdown of the provision shows the court's construction to have been erroneous.
The first sentence requires ((reimbursement'' under certain
circumstances. ((Reimbursement" is not generally used in referring to rights of action for breach of contract; it has been
defined as meaning ({to pay back" or to ({make return or
restoration of an equivalent for something paid, expended,
or lost" or to ({indemnify" Black's Law Dictionary ( 3rd Ed.)
1520. Damages for breach of contract are not based upon
indemnification but upon a difference in the value of the performance promised and that given.
The paragraph requires reimbursement for any ({wrongful
act or neglect." The word ({wrong" has been stated to signify,
in .its most usual sense, ((an in jury committed to the person
or property of another, or to his relative rights unconnected
with contract." Black's Law Dictionary (3rd Ed.) 1862.
((Neglect" is ordinarily used in connection with tortious conduct. Although it is true that the parties are probably liable
for their wrongful acts or neglects in any event, the sentence
broadens the common law liabilities of the parties by making
them guarantors of the conduct of persons employed by them.
The first sentence defines the contractual right; in so doing
it makes no reference to faulty workmanship or materials. If
it stood alone it would be clear that it was not intended to
limit the time within which action might be brought for failure
to perform the construction work as promised. The second
sentence, however, reads as follows:

f(Claitns under this clause shall be made in writing
to the party liable within a reasonable time at the first
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observance of such damage and not later than the time
of final payment, except as expressly stipulated otherwise in the case of faulty work or materials, and shall
be adjusted by agreement or arbitration." (R. 5.)
The court below must have interpreted this sentence as
broadening the meaning of ((wrongful act" and "neglect" so
as to bring within the operation of those words the type of
default referred to in the exception. The clause is somewhat
similar to the one involved in Employerl Liability Assur.

Corp., Ltd., v. Morrow ( 6 Cir. 1906), 143 Fed. 750. In that
case an insurance contract contained a number of clauses setting
out the compensation to be paid for various injuries. One of
the clauses contained the following exception:
''Except in the case of a claim consequent on the
death of the assured or loss of the sight of both eyes
or of the loss of two entire limbs."
It \vas argued that this exception made the proviso in which
it appeared repugnant to a previous clause. Said the court:
''If this exception had been omitted, the provision
could not possibly have applied to the cases mentioned
in the exception. The exception did not, therefore,
operate to take out of the proviso something '"hich,
but for the exception, \Yould have been included. Its
presence, therefore, cannot under such circumstances
bring within the proviso a claim ''"hich would not have
been "' ithin the proviso if the exception had been
omitted. The ordinary office of an exception or proviso
is to take special cases out of a general class or to guard
against misinterpretation. Experience shows, however,
that they quite frequently are introduced from excessive
caution, in sud1 cases operating only to bring confusion.
'l'hcrc is th) .~eneral rule requiring that t:\'ery other
l'Ll itn nr subject of the same general class as those
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excepted out shall be regarded as embraced in the
general words of the contract or law unless the general
language of the writing leaves it doubtful whether
the matters named in the exception would have otherwise been within the general terms of the law."
It has been stated ~hat the proper use of a proviso or
exception is nto qualify what is already affirmed or except
something from inclusion therein, but not to enlarge." Solomon
v. Neisner Bros., Inc. (1950), 93 F. Supp. 311, 318; affirmed
187 F.2d 735. Also, that the nordinary office of an exception
or a proviso is to take out of a contract that which otherwise
\vould have been included in it, or to guard against misinterpretation." 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 343; Sears v. Cbilds (1941),
35 N.E. 2d 663, 309 Mass. 357.
As construed by the trial court the exception in Paragraph
15 excepted nothing; it broadened the meaning of ccwrongful
act" or nneglect" to include failure of performance of the
contract, or, rather, so much of failure of performance of ~he
contract as was latent at the time of final payment. The court
looked at the exception as if it had been thrown into the contract
by someone who didn't know what was coming next, and
wanted the clause to a void repugnancy in event there was a
provision somewhere else in the contract relating to faulty
work or materials." Such an assumption might be legitimate
in the case of complicated Government contracts in which
typed special provisions are added to printed general provisions; but it is not legitimate where the entire contract is put
together as one typed document. At the time of signing the
contract the parties must have known that there was no express
stipulation elsewhere in the contract governing the time within
n
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which a claim for tcfaulty work and materials" had to be made.
They must have intended the clause to have some. effect; and
if the only effect intended was to broaden t'he meaning of
((wrongful act" and ((neglect" the parties chose a circuitous
route indeed. Nor is it reasonable to assume that they were
providing for some sort of future stipulation, since they could
have amended any part of the contract at any later time.
In accordance with the rules announced by the authorities
above cited, we believe Paragraph 15 must be construed as
applying only to conduct of the tort type, with the exception
added for the purpose of avoiding misinterpretation. That its
purpose misfired is no reason to ignore the purpose. By treating
the exception only as an exception both the law of semantics
and the parties' reasonable exception emerge intact.
The trial court's ruling was made without consideration
of any testimony and should not have the weight of a finding
of fact. Interpretation and construction of the contract is a
question of law in this instance and should be so treated by the
court. We recognize, of course, that facts may have a bearing
upan the interpretation of the contract, and would have been
prepared to show, for instance, that Paragraph 15 is the same
as Article 31 of the standard contract used by the American
Institute of Architects (See 2 Nichols Encyc. of Legal Forms,
Building and Construction Contracts, par. 2.1071, p. 283 ),
that in the A.I.A. contract the paragraph has not been used
to apply to faulty \\'Orkmanship and materials (2 Id. 280, Art.
20) ; and that the defendant is a man of experience in the
construction and rontracting business.
At the pre-trial it \vas adn1itted by the plaintiff that the
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contract in question was drawn by a scr1vener employed by
plaintiff (R. 38). Because of this admission the court apparently
concluded that the rule of contra proferentem justified it in
construing the contract ((against the plaintiff." It has been
stated that the rule is primarily a rule of policy to protect the
underdog ( 3 Corbin on Contracts 154) and that it should not
be applied until the court has had ({recourse to every aid, rule
or cannon of construction to ascertain the intention of the
parties." Reese Howell Co. v. Brown ( 1916), 48 Utah 142,
158 Pac. 684. As applied in this case, where there was neither
underdog nor recourse, the rule becomes merely a device for
punishing the inartistic.
This deserves reiteration: This action is for breach of the
very performance that was the subject matter of the contract.
We are not dealing with a collateral provision the breach of
which \vas technical only. To apply Paragraph 15 as an absolute
statute of limitations (and not a reasonable one, at that) is
to deprive the plaintiff of the right to get what he paid for.
On the other hand, by treating the exception as an exception
the defendant is not prejudiced. If the plaintiff accepted the
tuilding with knowledge of the defects the defendant has
protection in the doctrines of waiver and acquiescence. 9 Am.
Jur., Building and Construction Contracts, § 52 et seq.; Restatement of Contracts § 411; 3 Williston on Contracts (Rev.
Ed.) § 724. But these doctrines involve factual matter that
should not be the basis of a pre-trial ruling.
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II.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT CERTAIN DEFECTS WERE PATENT AND
OTHERS LATENT.
In interpreting Paragraph 15 the court distinguished between ((patent" and ((latent" defects. The contract itself does
not intimate that any different treatment was intended for
the two types of defects; the distinction was apparently made
because of the decision of this court in Kansas City Wholes ale
Groc. Co. v. Weber Packing Corp. (1937), 93 Utah 414, 73
P.2d 1272. That case, however, was concerned with a clause
containing an unequivocal non-claim provision; the Court
refused to give it validity in the case of patent defects. We
submit that the failure to make any distinction in the contract
is another reason for construing the clause as not applying to
faulty workmanship and materials.
Assuming t'he clause does apply to faulty workmanship and
materials, the Court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that
some defects were patent and others latent. It frequently has
been stated that latent defects are those which would not have
been discovered by a reasonable inspection. It is our position
that the question of what is a nreasonable examination" is a
question of fact depending upon the circumstances of the
case. We do not believe that there is anything in the ((nature"
of certain defects \vhich permits us to say that they are patent
or latent. The plaintiff should have been permitted to show
\vhat the circumstances were and what type of inspection would
have hrcn necessary to discover the defects. The Ka11Jas (il'V
ll" holesrde Gro(t)ry case, supra, at page 1275 of the Pacific
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Reporter, shows the extent to which circumstances are important
in determining whether a defect is patent or latent.
We do not believe that an incorrectly sloping roofparticularly where the slope called for is slight-is any more
patent than mold in ketchup.

III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD TO
PLAINTIFF A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT.
Paragraph 25 of the contract (R. 7) provides:
v'

"Should any party to this Agreement breach any of
the terms, conditions and provisions therein contained
then in that event the party found guilty of such breach
or violation shall pay to the other costs incurred together with a reasonable attorney's fee that may be
expended in enforcing the contract."

The court found as a fact (R. 60) that on November 29,
1956, the day of the trial, the defendant tendered and plaintiff
accepted $13 7.20 as full settlement of two of the claimed
defects ruled to have been latent. At the pre-trial it was agreed
that reasonable attorney's fee in case of trial was three hundred
dollars (R. 47).
The defendant's tender not having been made until the
time of trial, the plaintiff was entitled to costs and attorney's
fees incurred prior to that time unless counsel's action at the
trial rnay be interpreted as a waiver of any right to costs
(R. 49). In any event, there was no waiver of attorney's fee.
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Such fee having been shown to be payable it should have been
awarded whether asked for in the prayer or not. Rule 54 (c)
( 1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

CONCLUSION
The contract between plaintiff and defendant was silent
as to the time within whiCh claims are required to be made
for faulty workmanship or materials. This being so, the only
bar is the statute of limitations; and the present action was
brought before the statute had run. Although there may be
an issue as to acceptance of the building with knowledge of the
defects, that is a factual issue upon whiCh the plaintiff is entitled to a trial. It is submitted that the court below committed
error; and that by virtue of the error plaintiff was deprived
of his day in court. The judgment should be reversed and the
case remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,

BRYCE E. ROE
of Clyde & Mecham
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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